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When  used  in  conjunction  with  surface  water  for  irrigation,
groundwater serves two roles:  to  increase  water  supply;  and  to
mitigate fluctuations  in the supply of water.  The  latter  is  the
buffer role.  This paper  identifies  and  evaluates  the  economic
benefit  associated  with  the  buffer  role  of  groundwater.
Implications  for  the  development  of  groundwater  resources  are
investigated.  An estimate  is  given of  the buffer benefit to  wheat
growers of the fossil water aquifer underlying the  Israeli  Negev.
It  is  found that, under the prevailing variability in the supply of
surface water, this benefit may well exceed the groundwater benefit
associated with the increase  in water supply.The Buffer Role of Groundwater When Surface Water Supplies Are Uncertain:
The Implications For Groundwater Development
1. Introduction
When used in conjunction with surface water for  irrigation, groundwater
serves two roles:  first, to  increase water supply;  second, to mitigate
undesirable fluctuations  in the water supply. We refer to the latter  as the
buffer role of groundwater.  The purpose of this paper is  to assign an
economic value to the buffer role of groundwater and to investigate  its effect
on the development of groundwater resources.
The task of how to use groundwater in conjunction with surface water has
been the subject of much research, most notably that of Burt  (1964).  These
analyses  generally are carried out within a dynamic framework,  seeking a rule
for allocating the groundwater over time when the demand for groundwater
varies according to  available supply of surface water.  The buffer role  of
groundwater and its implications  for the development of groundwater resources
remain implicit in these analyses. The analysis here  is presented within a
single period model.  The results may be interpreted as  the solution of a
dynamic system that have reached a steady state or as an approximation of a
more  general dynamic model  (on the conditions that justify such an
approximation see Gisser  [1983]).
The term "conjunctive ground- and surface-water system"  is  applied to a
number of systems;  they differ according to the surface water source.  One
extreme is  a system in which the only source of surface water is  stream flows
emanating from aquifers.  A situation similar to  this  is considered in Young
and Bredehoeft  (1972).  In the other extreme, surface water is  independent of
groundwater sources.  Cummings and Winkelman  (1970) analyze a system near this2
extreme.  The system considered in this paper is  at the second extreme,  in
which surface water derives solely from precipitation.  This  is  the situation
in the region that concerns us,  the northern part of the Negev desert in
Israel.
While many of the factors affecting the development of groundwater
resources are  likely to be uncertain (see e.g.,Szidarovsky et al.  [1976],
Taylor and North  [1976]),  the present paper focuses only on the effect of
uncertainty  in the supply of surface water.  The analysis applies, perhaps
with some modifications, to any deterministic stock of water, such as  a
reservoir or a dam, playing the role of groundwater.
The next section (an extension of Section 3 of Tsur and Issar  [1987])
identifies  the benefit associated with the buffer role of groundwater, denoted
as the buffer value of groundwater.  In section 3, the  task of choosing the
appropriate capacity for a groundwater project is  analyzed.  It is  shown that,
in general,  the capacity of the groundwater project should increase with the
variability  in the supply of surface water.  This result may explain observed
cases of apparent over-investment in well capacity (Bredehoeft and Young
[1983]).  Section 4 applies the analysis to the fossil water aquifer
underlying the Negev desert in Israel.  It demonstrates  that, under the
prevailing rainfall variability, the buffer value of groundwater to growers of
unirrigated wheat in the northern Negev may well exceed the benefit associated
with the  increased water supply.  Implications for the development of the
aquifer are discussed.  A brief summary, Section 5, concludes  the paper.3
2.  The Buffer Value of Groundwater
Let S indicate the stochastic supply of surface water distributed
according to some cumulative distribution function H.  It is assumed that H is
uniquely defined by the vector of moments  0-(p,a,...),  where  (p,a,...)
represents  the mean, standard deviation and higher moments of S.  In the
absence of groundwater, growers use  the realized amount of surface water and
enjoy the operating profit per hectare  (ha) of pF(S),  where F(-)  represents
per hectare yield response  to water and p is the net unit value of output.
When operating in a certain environment profit is  pF(p).  The water response
function F(.)  depends on other variable inputs, but these can be suppressed by
a conditional optimization over these  inputs given  prices and the level of
water input.
Suppose now that groundwater becomes available at a fixed price of $z/m 3.
Let K(z) indicate the  level of water input satisfying pF'(K(z))-z  (see Figure
1).  In a stable environment, where surface water supply is fixed at i,  the
demand for  groundwater is  K(z)-p m3/ha, provided K(z)>p.  The net benefit of
groundwater, obtained by subtracting from total profit the cost of groundwater
and the profit of surface water, is  equal  to  ($/ha)
pF(K(z))  - z[K(z)-p]  - pF(p)  if  K(z) > p
Bc(p,z,A) - {  . (2.1)
0  otherwise
In Figure  1,  Bc  equals  the area  (abc).
Figure 1
The demand for groundwater in an uncertain environment, with stochastic
surface water supplies S, depends on whether growers make their decisions
before or after the actual  realization of S is  observed.  Each situation gives
rise to a different  buffer values of groundwater.  The buffer value of4
groundwater corresponding to situations where decisions on groundwater demand
are made after the actual realization of S is observed will be labeled as ex
post, while that corresponding to situations where decisions must be made  in
advance of the realization of S will be referred to as  ex ante.  Throughout we
assume  risk neutrality on the part of growers.
Given observations on the actual realization of surface water, and
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provided this level does not exceed K(z),  the ex post demand for groundwater
is K(z)-S m3/ha.  It provides the net benefit:  pF(K(z))-z[K(z)-S]-pF(S).  The
mean of this net benefit, when the randomness of S is accounted for,  is  given
by  ($/ha):
Bp(p,z,#)  - p[F(K(z))-E{F(S))]  - z[k(z)-p].  (2.2)
where E is  the expectation operator with respect to the distribution H and is
therefore a function of 8.
In the ex ante scenario the demand for groundwater, g  ,  is determined
from _M(E(pF(S+g))-zg) and yields the expected net benefit
Bu(p,z,#) - pE(F(S+g )-F(S))  - zg . (2.3)
The buffer value of groundwater is  defined as the difference between the
net benefit of groundwater in the uncertain and certain environments.  It is
the amount a grower facing an uncertain surface water supply, S, would be
willing to pay for groundwater over and above the corresponding amount he or
she would be willing to pay had the surface water supplies been certain at  i.
In other words,  it is  a measure of how much a producer would be willing to pay
to move from a situation in which surface water supplies  fluctuate about a
mean p  to a stable  environment in which this supply  is fixed at the level p.
Given the definitions above and provided K(z)>p,  the ex post buffer5
value  is given as
BVP(p,z,e)  - BS(p,z,8)-Bc(p,z,/)  - p[F(p)  - E{F(S))].  (2.4)
the ex ante buffer value  is  (after some algebraic manipulations)
BVa(p,z,O) , B5(p,z,B)  - Bc(p,z,A) -
- BVP(p,z,)  +  {pE(F(S+g))  pF(K(z))  - z[ga-(K(z)-A)]}.  (2.5)
By assuming that F(-)  is strictly concave and using Jensen's  inequality,
it follows that BVP is  positive.  The introduction of groundwater has shifted
the uncertainty from production to costs.  Since costs are linear  in
groundwater quantity, producers are  indifferent to uncertainty in this
component.  Production, on the other hand, is concave  in water input and
stability in the water input  is therefore desirable.
The following simple example illustrates  this point.  Suppose  there are
only two possible states of the nature, which are equally likely to occur.  In
the first S-s , corresponding  to a drought year, and in the second S-s2, where
s  <s<K (the argument z is  dropped from K(.)  for notational convenience).  At
the beginning of the year, before the realization of S is known, the  farmer
enjoys the random profit pF(sl) or pF(s2) with equal probabilities.  In Figure
1, pF(sl)-area(hgslo)  and pF(s2)-area(hds2o).  In comparison with the
situation where S is  stable at the level y, this may be viewed as an uncertain
prospect in which the farmer loses the amount given by area(gapsl) with
probability 0.5 and gains  the amount given by area(ads 2p)  with probability
0.5.  Since the derived demand for water slopes  downward (resulting from the
strict concavity of F),  this  is  an unfavorable bet entailing a negative
expected gain.  Even a risk neutral grower prefers  the stabilized situation
under such circumstances.  The amount a grower would be willing to  pay to6
ensure stabilization is  BVP $/ha, which  is  given by e-f in Figure 1.
By expanding F(S) about p, letting 7--F"(p)/F'(p),  BVP can be
approximated as:
BV P .5pF'(p)o2.
This illuminates  the dependence of BVP on:  a) the value of marginal
productivity of water at  input level p  (pF'(p)); b) the degree of concavity of
F at p  (7);  and c) the variance in  surface water supply (ao).
The ex ante index BV" differs from BVP by the term inside the large curly
brackets on the right hand side of (2.5).  It readily is verified that this
term  is negative;  thus  BVP > BV. 3 In contrast to  the  ex post scenario, in
the ex ante, when growers commit themselves  to a certain amount of groundwater
before observing the actual realization of surface water, some of the
uncertainty in water  input to production is  retained, leading to a lower
buffer value.
Whether the ex ante or ex post concept is  appropriate depends on how the
market for groundwater operates.  An argument can be made  in favor of the  ex
post procedure.  Empirical evidence suggests that,  in many cases,  the derived
demand for irrigation water  is convex toward the origin  (see, e.g.,  Howitt et
al.  [1980]).  This  is an indication that the water response function F(-)  has
a positive third derivative.  In such cases, g  exceeds K-p,  which is  the
4
average groundwater demand under the ex post procedure.  Thus, on average,
more  groundwater is consumed under the  ex ante allocation mechanism than
under the ex post one.  Conservation of groundwater resources has been, and
will continue to be, an issue of great concern.  Furthermore, in the ex post
scenario farmers  are better informed, hence use groundwater more efficiently.
Thus, for example,  a farmer operating under the  ex ante mechanism uses the7
pre-committed  (pre-paid) quantity of groundwater g  even when the supply of
surface water eventually happens to be so  large that  the groundwater entails
losses.
Aside from the above remarks, no further evaluations or comparisons will
be made of the  two groundwater allocation mechanisms.  From now on the focus
is  exclusively on the  ex post situation, which is  the one prevailing in the
case we wish to  study--the Negev region in Israel. The ex post buffer value
will simply be referred to  as BV.
3.  Capacity Choice
The presence of a positive buffer value implies that groundwater is worth
more  in an uncertain environment than in a certain one, even though the usage
rate is,  on average,  the  same in both cases.  A cost benefit argument should
thus support  larger capacity investment in groundwater pumping facilities in
regions where fluctuations  in surface water supplies are  larger.  This
section undertakes an analysis of this proposition.  The significance of the
error made in the capacity choice when the buffer role of groundwater is
neglected  (i.e.,  when surface water supplies  are regarded as fixed at  their
mean level)  depends on the  size of the buffer value of groundwater.  The case
of the  Israeli Negev region, discussed in the next section, suggests that  this
error may be substantial.
The capacity of a groundwater project is  the maximum quantity of
groundwater that can be supplied in a given year and is denoted by Q.  Let
C(Q) be the annual imputed cost of the investment  in a groundwater project of
capacity Q. The cost function C(-)  is  generated by the technology of
groundwater extraction and  is assumed to be non-decreasing in Q.  The8
criterion for choosing the capacity Q depends mainly on the structure  of the
groundwater supply industry including the extraction technology, who owns the
groundwater and the rules governing well placement and extract rates--an
interesting subject  on its own, but one that lies outside the scope  of this
paper.  Here we assume  that the capacity of the groundwater project is  chosen
so as to maximize expected net benefit.
Let A be the number of cultivated hectares and q-Q/A denote the capacity
per hectare.  In an uncertain environment, the use of groundwater  (per
hectare) and the resulting benefit it generates depend on the state of the
nature S:  if S>K, no groundwater  is  used;  in the event K-q<SK, K-S m3/ha of
groundwater are applied and the aggregate benefit is A[pF(K)-z(K-S)]-C(Q);
in the event SK-q, the entire capacity level q is utilized providing the
5 benefit A[pF(S+q)-zq]-C(Q).  The expected total net benefit of groundwater,
with stochastic surface water supplies S, is  thus given by
Wu(Q) - A[E(pF(K)-z(K-S)IK-q<SSK)Prob(K-q<S<K) +
E{pF(S+q)-zqlS<K-q)Prob(SK-q) ] - C(Q) - A-E{pF(S)ISK)Prob(SK).  (3.1)
With stable surface water supplies,  the level of groundwater use  is q,
provided that q<K-p,  and the associated aggregate benefit is
Wc(Q)  - A[pF(p+q)-zq]  - C(Q) - A-pF(A)  (3.2)
Maximizing Wu and Wc with respect to Q, recalling that q-Q/A, yields  the
necessary conditions:
E(pF'(S+qu)-zlSK-qu)Prob(SK-qu) - C'(Qu)  (3.3)
and
pF'(p+qc)  - z -C'(Qc),  (3.4)9
where Qu and Qc are the capacity levels  that maximize Wu and We,  respectively,
and qu-Qu/A, qc-Qc/A.6 The total net benefits  of groundwater are determined
by evaluating Wu and Wc  at the capacity choices Qu and Qc:  Wu - Wu(Qu)  and
Wc  - Wc(Qc).  These benefit indexes serve as the economic criteria for the
decision on whether or not to develop a given  groundwater aquifer.  They may
differ substantially from each other, as  the example of the next section
indicates.
To gain insight into the difference between the capacity choices  qu and
qc,  suppose first that C'(Q) is negligible. Condition (3.3)  requires qu-K and
condition  (3.5) yields qc-K-A. 7 Thus  the groundwater capacity in the unstable
environment is  sufficient to  fulfill  the groundwater demand in the worse
possible case where S-O.  This finding explains, to some extent,apparent
over-investment in well capacity in locations with high variability in supply
of surface water.  Bredehoeft and Young (1983) attribute  such observations to
effects of risk aversion.  Here it  is  shown that such outcomes may be
justified without assuming risk aversion.
In cases where C'(Q ) > 0, conditions  (3.3)  and (3.4) require  qu < K and
qc <  K-#.  As expected, capacity decreases with the marginal capacity costs.
However, it can be shown that, in most cases, the result that qu  exceeds qc  is
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preserved.  Thus,  investments  in developing groundwater resources,  if
desirable at  all, are likely to be larger under the unstable environment.
The variability in the supply of surface water causes some of the
groundwater capacity to stand idle  some of the time  (the entire capacity is
idle when S>K and a fraction is  idle when K-qu<S<K).  With stable surface
water supplies the groundwater capacity is fully employed.  The  cost of idle
capacity provides an offsetting disincentives to  invest in groundwater10
development when surface water supplies are unstable.  Nevertheless,  the
presence of the buffer role of groundwater is  sufficient to outweigh this
effect and to make  investment in developing groundwater resources more
desirable when surface water supplies fluctuate.  Indeed it can be  shown that
*  *
the difference Wu  - We  and the buffer value of groundwater are related through
Wu  - Wc  - A.BV(qu,qc)  - [C(Qu)-C(Qc)],  (3.5)
where BV(qu,qc)  is  the buffer value  in the presence of  the capacity limits qu
and qc.  The verification of (3.5)  and the extension of the buffer value to
situations  involving capacity constraints  is  left for the Appendix.
The capacity choice rule described above  implicitly assumes a steady
state  situation, i.e.,  that  the average  rate of water recharge into the
aquifer is  at least as big as  the average annual withdrawal of groundwater.
If  this  is not the case, a decline  in the groundwater table takes place, which
causes an increase  in pumping costs, z, which in turn reduces the demand for
groundwater over time.  This process will continue until the system reaches a
steady state.
It may happen that the rate of water replenishment  is negligible;
examples are  the  so called fossil water aquifers  (Margat and Saad  [1984]).  In
such cases,  to pump water means to mine water and such activities must be
determined within an intertemporal framework to account for water scarcity, in
addition to the user cost of the water.  The intertemporal allocation of
groundwater resources has been addressed by numerous authors  (Burt  [1964b],
Burt and Cummings  [1970],  Cummings and Winkelman  [1970],  Domenico et al
[1968],  among others);  the task of analyzing the buffer role of groundwater
within this framework is  left for future research.Closely related to  the case of a nonrenewable aquifer is  the  issue of
irreversibility of capital  investments  in pumping capacity.  If depletion of
the aquifer is eventually to occur, much of the pumping facility will then
become idle and the  future cost of idleness should effect present capacity
decisions.
The problem of capital immalleability in long-term resource allocation is
considered, among others, in Cummings  and Burt  (1969)  (also in their 1970
paper),  and Clark et al.  (1979).  A discussion of how well a static allocation
scheme approximates an intertemporal one can be found in Gisser and Sanchez
(1980),  and Gisser (1983).  The  task of capacity choice within a dynamic model
is  treated, in a related context,  in Hochman et al.  (1984).  These questions
are also beyond the scope of this paper.
4.  An illustrative example
The Negev desert comprises the southern, arid part of Israel and is part
of the desert belt extending from the Sahara  through Egypt to the Arabian
Desert.  The northern part of the Negev contains large amounts of arable land
and is characterized by high variability of precipitation.  Table 1 presents
data on annual  rainfall in the period 1949-50 to  1986-87  as measured in
Kibbutz Beit-Qama,  located in the center of the northern Negev.
Table 1
A large portion of the cultivated land is  allocated to  unirrigated wheat.  In
1985,  the total cultivated area in the Negev was 77,551.5 hectares  (ha),  out
of which 52,008.5 ha were allocated to unirrigated wheat  (Israel Ministry of
Agriculture and the Jewish Agency  [1985]).12
Except for the heavens, additional water sources are local  aquifers and
the national water conveyor that carries water from the northern part of the
country.  Both sources are exploited to  their limits.  The use  of local
aquifers  is  limited by considerations of water recharge and water quality;
shipping water from the north is  simply an expensive operation.
A potential water source, utilized to some extend in the Arava valley of
the southern Negev, is  the large aquifer of fossil water underlying the Negev
and the Sinai peninsula (see  Issar  [1985]  for a hydrological account).  Though
feasibility studies on the development and use of this aquifer in the northern
Negev can be found, most notably that of Tushia (1981),  many cost components
are  still unknown.  Thus, various levels  of pumping cost, z, and marginal
capacity cost,C'(Q)-c, will be considered.
To evaluate the buffer value of the fossil groundwater associated
with unirrigated wheat in the northern Negev, requires first to estimate the
wheat response to water.  To that end, data of wheat yield and rainfall
quantities were collected from unirrigated fields of the kibbutzim Beit-Qama




The water production function is specified as
ra-f/x  if x > a/f
F(x) - {  . (4.1)
0  otherwise
For its non-vanishing part, this is a concave function which, as  the water
input x (m  /ha) is increased, approaches the maximum yield a (kg/ha) at a rate
which depends on P.  Allowing the water production function F(-)  to vanish on
some positive interval of water  input requires some modifications of the
analysis of Sections 2 and 3.  These modifications are presented in the13
Appendix.
The regression of yield  (kg/ha) on the inverse  of water input
(l/(m3/ha)),  using the data of Table 2, provides  the following estimates (t
values are  in parentheses):
A  A
a  - 4,548.809;  3 - 7,145,701;  R2-.65;  DW - 1.85;  28  observations.
( 10.3)  ( 6.9  7)
A  A
The estimates  imply that a minimum water application of P/a-1570.9 m3/ha
(equivalent to 157.09 mm rain) is  required to obtain a positive yield, and
A
that the maximum attainable yield equals, on average, a - 4548.809 kg/ha.
We consider two levels of wheat price  (p) and four levels of groundwater
price  (z):  p-  $0.193/kg,  the price received by Israeli wheat growers  in 1985;
p-  $0.12/kg, which better reflects the market price of wheat in 1985;  z-0.05,
0.1, 0.15 and 0.2  $/m . We assume first that the groundwater capacity does
not constitute a constraint and calculate  the (per hectare) buffer value for
each p,z combination using formula (A.3) of the Appendix.  The results are
presented in Table 3, which also presents:  estimates of the groundwater
benefit attributed to  the increase  in the water supply,  i.e.  the groundwater
benefit that would prevail  if rainfall were stable at p-2931.18 m3/ha, denoted
Bc  [cf. equation  (2.1)].  Table 3 also contains  the average groundwater demand
per hectare K  - p.  Details on the method of calculation of the buffer value
are provided in the Appendix.
Table 3
Table 3 reveals that when wheat price is  0.193 $/kg and groundwater costs
3
$0.1/m , the buffer value of groundwater in the northern Negev is BV -
$48.4/ha and the benefit due to increase  in water supply is  Bc - $20.89/ha.14
The benefit of groundwater due to  its buffer role is  more than twice the
benefit associated with  its role  in increasing the water supply.  The total
groundwater benefits  (per hectare)  is  the sum of the two:  48.4 + 20.89 -
$69.29/ha.
In calculating the capacity choices we consider the case where the cost
function C(Q)  is  linear in the capacity Q.  This constant marginal capacity
choice  is  denoted by c.  For various  levels of p, z and c, Table 4 presents:
qu--the capacity choice under the prevailing rainfall variability;  qc--the
capacity choice calculated under the assumption that rainfall quantities are
stable at p  - 2931.18 m3/ha  (equivalent to  293.118 mm rainfall);  Bu and
Bc--the net benefits from groundwater (abstracting from fixed costs)
associated with qu  and qc,  defined in equations  (A.2) and  (2.1);  and
BV-Bu-Bc--the buffer value of groundwater with the capacity constraints qu,qc.
Table 4
The results of Table 4 reveal that when the prices of wheat and
groundwater are $0.12/kg and $0.1/m3,  respectively, the development of
groundwater would not be desirable  if annual rainfall were taken to  be stable
at  its mean.  Under the prevailing rainfall variability, the desired
groundwater capacity is  qu - 2,130.28 m3/ha, 1,720.29 m3/ha or 0 m3/ha as c -
0, 0.001 or  0.01, respectively.  Multiplying by A-52,008.5 ha (the area of
unirrigated wheat recorded in the northern Negev at  1985) yields the
respective aggregate capacities.
Consider, for the  sake of illustration, the case where c - 0.001, p -
$0.193/kg and z - $0.1/m3. The  total net benefit of groundwater to  growers of
unirrigated wheat  in the northern Negev (abstracting from the fixed costs15
C(Qu))  is  Bu-A - $2.9645 million per year.  Under the  same scenario but with
surface water supplies regarded as  fixed at p-2,931.18 m3/ha, total net
benefit of groundwater  is  Bc-A - $1.086 million per year.  If the annual
(imputed)  capacity cost levels C(Qc)  and C(Qu) fall between these two levels,
developing the groundwater aquifer cannot be justified on economic grounds
when surface water supplies are assumed stable;  whereas with the prevailing
instability the development is warranted.  With wheat price at the level
p-$.12/kg and everything else  remaining the  same, developing the fossil water
aquifer may still be warranted as  long as  the annual  fixed costs  do not
exceed $764,000.
5.  Summary
When the supply of surface water  is uncertain, groundwater, in addition
to  its  role in increasing the water supply, serves also as a buffer  that
mitigates undesirable fluctuations in water supply.  In this paper, we
evaluate  the benefit associated with the buffer role of groundwater.
Implications  for the development of groundwater resources  are then
investigated.  It was found that, in general, the investment in groundwater
should increase with the variability of  the supply of surface water.  Thus,
depending on the cost structure of  the groundwater pumping technology, a
pumping capacity sufficient to  irrigate the entire region may indeed be
desirable if the supply of surface water falls to zero.  Application of the
analysis  to the fossil water aquifer underlying the Negev desert in Israel
reveals  that, with the prevailing variability in annual rainfall, the
magnitude of the buffer value of groundwater may well exceed the groundwater
benefit attributed to  the average increase  in water supply.16
The present analysis can be extended in various directions.  First, by
accounting for intra-season variability in the supply of surface water.  In
general, yield response to water depends not only on the quantity of water
available, but also on how this quantity is  applied during the growing season
(see, e.g.,  Yaron et al.  [1973]).  We expect that allowing the  groundwater to
improve  the timing of water application within the growing season, would even
magnify the buffer role of groundwater.  Second, by considering the effects of
various crop  insurance schemes that are known to  exist.  We expect that
allowing farmers to insure against low levels of surface water supplies would
mitigate  the buffer role of groundwater.  Finally, the output and groundwater
prices may be considered to be determined endogenously;  the first depending on
the level  of output and the second on the  level of groundwater consumed.
Appendix
In the example of Section four,  the production function F(-)  vanishes  for
some positive interval of water  inputs and the supply of surface water exceeds
K  with a positive probability.  This Appendix provides  the extension needed to
account for such cases as well as a description of  the procedures used to
obtain the estimates reported in Tables  3  and 4.
In cases where F(x)-O for some positive interval of water inputs,
groundwater that costs $z/m  will be demanded only when L<S'K, where L is
defined from
pF(K) - z(K-L) - 0,  (A.1)
and it is recalled that K, defined in Section 2, is the level satisfying
pF'(K)-z.  (It is easy to verify that when S<L, any quantity of groundwater
bought at a price $z/m  entails losses.)  When Prob(S<L or S>K) is  strictly17
positive, the net benefit defined in equation (2.2)  is modified as
Bu - E(pF(K)-z(K-S)  - pF(S)IL<SIK).Prob(LS<_K).
Using the relation E(X}-E{XIA)Prob(A)+E{Xlnot A)Prob(not A) for any random
variable X and an event A, Bu can be rewritten as
Bu - pF(K) - z(K-p)  - pE(F(S))  -
E(pF(K)-z(K-S)-pF(S)IS<L or S>K)Prob(S<L or  S>K).  (A.2)
By subtracting Be,  of equation (2.1),  the buffer value becomes
BV - p[F(p)-E{F(S))]  - E{pF(K)-z(K-S)-pF(S)IS<L or S>K)Prob(S<L or  S>K) (A.3)
Note that whenever Prob(S<L)-Prob(S>K)-0,  the buffer value defined in  (A.3)
coincides with that of (2.4).
We turn now to the capacity choice task.  Under a capacity constraint q,
the level of surface water supply below which groundwater will not be demanded
is  denoted by L(q) and is  determined from
pF(L(q)+q)  - zq - 0.  (A.4)
As in the definition of L above, it  is  easy to verify that, with a capacity
limit q, when S < L(q),  any quantity of groundwater that costs $z/m  entails
losses.  Thus  L(q) replaces L.  Wu of equation (3.1) becomes
Wu(Q) - E{A[pF(K)-z(K-S)]IK-q<S5K)Prob(K-q<SsK)  +
E{A[pF(S+q)-zq]IL(q)-q<SK-q)Prob(L(q)<SK-q) - C(Q) -
- E{pF(S)lS<K}Prob(S<K),  (A.5)
and the necessary condition (3.3)  is modified accordingly as
E{pF'(S+qu)-zlL(qu)<SK-qu)Prob(L(L(q  S<SK-qu)  - C'(Qu)  (A.6)
The sufficient conditions  for Qu and Qc  to be local maxima of Wu and We  are,
K-qu
respectively,  I  pF"(S+qu)h(S)dS<C"(Qu) and pF"(p+qc)<C"(Qc).  The
L(qu)18
strengthened condition
pF"(x) < C"(y)  for all OSxaK,  OSySA-K  (A.7)
guarantees  global maxima.
With the capacity constraints qu and qc,  further modification in the
definition of the buffer value  is required.  Bu, of equation  (A.2), with a
capacity constraint  qu,  becomes:
Bu(qu) - E{pF(K)-z(K-S)IK-qu￿SSK)Prob(K-qu<SSK)  +
+  E(pF(S+qu)-zqulL(qu)<S<K-qu)Prob(L(qu)SS<K-qu)  -
- E{pF(S)ISsK)Prob(SSK).  (A.8)
Likewise,  Bc  defined in equation (2.1),  is modified, in the presence of a
capacity limit qc<K-p,  to:
jpF(A+qc)  - zqc  - pF(p)  if K >p
Bc(qc)  - . (A.9
O  otherwise
The buffer value with capacity constraints qu and qc  is  given by
BV(qu,qc)  - Bu(qu)  - Bc(qc).  (A.10)
Using (A.8)-(A.10) and that Wu-Wu(Qu),  Wc-W(Qc)  [Wu  and Wc are  defined in
equations  (3.1)-(3.2)],  equation  (3.5) can be verified.
The buffer values reported in Table 3 are calculated as follows.  For
each level of p and z, we calculate K-JpP/z and L-K-pF(K)/z,  where F(-)  is
A  A  A  A
defined in  (4.1) with its parameters evaluated at a,p and P/a - 1579.9 m3/ha
as  the level of water input below which production ceases.  Corresponding to
the rainfall  series St, t-1,2,...,38, presented in Table 1, the series F(St)
A  38
is constructed and the mean p  is  estimated by p  -tlSt/38 - 2931.18 m3/ha.
The first,  second and third terms on the right hand side of  (A.3) are19
A  38
estimated, respectively, by I - p[F(p)- tlF(St)/38],  II - [pF(K)-zK]N(K,L)/38
+ z  Z  St/38 and III  - p 2  F(St)/38, where N(K,L) - (# of cases with St<L or
N(K,L)  S  2K
t
St>K)  and  Z  represents summation over these cases.  BV  is  estimated by
N(K,L)
I - II  + III.
The estimation of the  terms  reported in Table 4 is now described.  The
definition of L(q)  in  (A.4) and the form of F(-)  given in  (4.1) imply that
A  A  A  A
L(q)-//(a-zq/p)-q.  Given values for p and z and the estimates a,  P,  the
series Rt(q) - pF'(St+q)-z can be constructed for any value q, where F'(x) - 0
A  2  A  A  3
or P/x  as x is  less than or greater than P/a-1570.9 m3/ha, respectively  [cf.
equation (4.1)].  Following  (A.6) and given c (-C'),  qu  is  found as  the level
of q satisfying
E  Rt(q)/38  - c.  (A.11)
L(q)SS tK-q
Following (3.4) and given the form of F, qc  is  estimated as
A  A
qc - jpp/(z+c)  - A,  (A.12)
provided the  right hand side of (A.12) is positive;  qc-0  otherwise.  The  third
item reported in Table 4 is Bu(qu).  It is  Estimated, following (A.8), by
[pF(K)-z(K-St)]/38 +  [pF(St+qu)-zqu]/38  - pF(St)/38.
K-qu<S  <K  L(qu)<s t K-q  s  <K
t  t  U  t
A  A
Bc(qc)  is estimated directly, using  (A.9), by pF(p+gc)  - zqc  - pF(p),  provided
qc>0;  it  is equal to zero  otherwise;  Finally, the buffer value when capacity
limits are  qu and qc  is  evaluated as the difference between the estimates of
Bu(qu)  and Bc(qc).20
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Footnotes
Obviously,  allowing for risk aversion would affect the demand for water  (see
e.g.,  Lyon  [1983])  and, thereby, the buffer value of groundwater.  However, as
will soon become apparent, the presence of a positive buffer value is  not at
all a result of risk aversion (even though risk aversion may affect its
magnitude).  We therefore maintain risk neutrality.
For clarity of presentation, it  is  assumed throughout this  section that the
level of surface water supply may not exceed K(z),  i.e.,  that Prob(S>K(z))-O,
and that the water response function F(.)  is  strictly concave for any positive
level of water input.  The general case, where S may exceed K(z)  and F may be
convex for low levels of water input, is  left for the Appendix.
Define D(x,g )-p[F(x+g )-F(K)]-z[g -(K-p)]  and note, from (2.5),  that
BVa-BVP-E{D(S,g )).  Hence the strict concavity of F, using Jensen's
inequality again, implies  that BVa-BVP < D(p,g ).  Now note that for all
levels of ga, D(p,ga)<0 with equality holding only for ga-K-p.
Recall that g  solves Ma(pE(F(S+g))-zg) and satisfies pE(F'(S+g ))-z,
whereas K satisfies pF'(K)-z.  Expanding F'(S+g ) about p+g  ,  using the
strict concavity of F and assuming F"'>O, verifies ga>K-.
5If obtaining positive yield requires a minimal positive  amount of water, it
is possible that groundwater will not be demanded when S falls short of some
critical  level.  This situation is  treated in the Appendix.23
6To verify  (3.3),  rewrite  (3.1),  disregarding its  rightmost term, as Wu -
K  K-q
MA  j[pF(K)-z(K-S)]h(S)dS + j[pF(S+q)-zq]h(S)dS  - C(Q),  where h(.)  is  the
K-q  0 
density function of S.  Now differentiate Wu with respect to Q, recalling
K-q
q-Q/A, to obtain 8Wu/aq - f[pF'(S+q)-z]h(S)dS  - C'(Q) -
0
E(pF'(S+q)-zlSSK-q)Prob(SK-q) - C'Q).
7To verify that qu-K in this  case note that pF'(S+qu)>z for all  levels of S
satisfying S<K-qu. Thus,  E(pF'(S+qu)-zlSK-qu) > 0 for all  qu > 0 (cf. Figure
1) and the left hand side of (3.3) vanishes only when Prob(SK-qu)-O.
Assuming that S can take any positive value with a positive probability,
Prob(SsK-qu)-O requires qu-K.
Suppose C'(Q) is constant, say C'(Q)-c, and that the derived demand for water
is  convex toward the origin so that F"'>O.  Then pF'(p+q)-z < E(pF'(S+q)-z) -
E{pF'(S+q)-zlS<K-q)Prob(S<K-q)+E(pF'(S+q)-zlSSK-q)Prob(S2K-q).  But the last
conditional expectation term is  non-positive because pF'(S+q)<z for all S>K-q
(cf. Figure  1).  Hence pF'(p+q)-z <  E(pF'(S+q)-zlS<K-q)Prob(S<K-q) for all
levels of q.  Now if qu  satisfies  (3.3),  it is clear that setting qc-qu causes
a violation of (3.4);  qc must be smaller than qu for  (3.4) to hold.  This
result can be extended to more general capacity cost functions.Table 1.
The series St:  annual amounts of rain  (mm)  as measured in Kibbutz
Beit-Qama located in the center of the northern Negev.
Year  Rain  Year  Rain  Year  Rain  Year  Rain
1949-50  407.5  1959-60  116.8  1969-70  222.3  1979-80  543.6
1950-51  189.5  1960-61  304.7  1970-71  326.2  1980-81  278.6
1951-52  334.3  1961-62  139.4  1971-72  415.2  1981-82  213.8
1952-53  246.6  1962-63  79.8  1972-73  281.1  1982-83  477.1
1953-54  303.4  1963-64  461.2  1973-74  422.7  1983-84  173.1
1954-55  222.2  1964-65  448.6  1974-75  273.6  1984-85  239.5
1955-56  374.3  1965-66  177.3  1975-76  194.8  1985-86  205.4
1956-57  504.9  1966-67  364.1  1976-77  272.1  1986-87  360.8
1957-58  233.3  1967-68  362.2  1977-78  253.6
1958-89  239.2  1968-69  233.6  1978-79  242.4
mean (St)  - 293.118
standard deviation (St) - 110.957
Table 2.
Average yield (kg/ha) and amount  of rainfall  (translated into m3/ha)  of
unirrigated wheat fields  of Beit-Qama and Mishmar-Hanegev
Yield  Water  Yield  Water  Yield  Water  Yield  Water
(kh/ha) (m3/ha)  I  (kh/ha) (m3/ha)  I (kg/ha) (m3 /ha)  (kh/ha) (m3/ha)
900  2200  360  1780  610  2780  1940  4070
1660  2300  1960  3440  1530  2450  470  1760
1350  2575  520  1500  1280  2500  2530  3930
1720  2670  800  2050  3090  3180  350  1550
800  2190  500  1760  3300  3170  1380  2721
3000  5436  2155  2786  737  2138  4952  4771
1100  1731  1090  2395  1230  2054  3575  3608Table 3.
Buffer value  (BV),  groundwater benefit due  to increase  in water
supply (Bc) and average groundwater consumption E(k-s)
with no capacity constraints
Z:  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2
BV  ($/ha)  52.56  48.40  33.26  14.7
P=.193  Bc($/ha)  91.87  20.89  0.52  0.0
E{k-s)(m 3/ha)  2325.56  970.05  511.34  242.45
BV  ($/ha)  31.85  17.77  4.29  0.74
P=.12  Bc($/ha)  24.97  0.0  0.0  0.0
E{k-s)(m3/ha)  1308.57  451.19  144.11  25.05
Table 4.
Capacity choices  (qu and qc,)  net benefits from groundwater
(Bu and Bc)  and the buffer value for growers of
unirrigated wheat in the northern Negev region.
C:  0.0  0.001  0.01
qu(m3/ha)  2915.65  2436.29  1556.37
P=.193  qu(m3/ha)  782.47  764.04  609.64
Bu(qu)($/ha)  69.29  57.00  49.42
Bc(q)($/ha)  20.89  20.88  20.04
BV(quqc)($/ha)  48.40  36.12  29.38
qu(m3/ha)  2130.28  1720.29  715.44
P=.12  qu(m3/ha)  0  0  0
Bc($/ha)  0  0  0
BV($/ha)*|  17.77  14.69  11.81
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